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Abstract
This paper investigates the evolution of the Chinese land regime in
the past three decades and focus on one question: why has the land use reform
succeeded in the urban area, but not in the rural area? Through asking this
question, it presents a holistic view of Chinese land reform, rather than the
conventional "rural land rights conflict" picture. This paper argues that the so-
called rural land problem is the consequence of China's partial land use
reform. In 1988, the Chinese government chose to conduct land use reform
sequentially: first urban and then rural. It was a pragmatic move because it
would provoke much less resistance. It also made local governments in China
the biggest beneficiary and supporter of the partial reform. However, a
beneficiary of partial reform does not necessarily support further reform
because of the excessive rents available between the market of urban real
estate and the government-controlled system of rural land development and
transfer. On the other hand, Chinese farmers and other relevant groups have
no voice or power in the political process of the reform, which makes it
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difficult for the central government o achieve an agenda that balances the
interests of all relevant parties. Nevertheless, Chinese farmers have challenged
the existing system by forming a huge small-property market to claim their
interests in rural land, which counteracts the goals of the central and local
governments and has led to adaptive policy changes. This case study of
Chinese land reform provides a richer account of the political process of
evolution of property rights.
Introduction
This paper investigates the evolution of the Chinese land regime in
the past three decades and focus on one question: why has the land use reform
succeeded in the urban area, but not in the rural area? Through asking this
question, it presents a holistic view of Chinese land reform, rather than the
conventional "rural land rights conflict" picture.'
Demsetz presents a classic theory on the evolution of property rights,
in which new forms of property rights will emerge if the benefit is greater than
the cost of creating them.' Levmore emphasizes the influence of interest
groups in the evolution of property rights,4 but does not conduct in-depth
investigation on the mechanism through which interest groups influence the
evolution of property rights nor how to address them in this context. In an
unrelated article, Levmore does discuss interest groups in detail-interest
groups might lead to overregulation in incremental reforms because people
who have been under regulation would like to see others regulated, even if this
2 See, e.g., Eva Pils, Land Disputes, Rights Assertion, and Social Unrest in China: A Case
from Sichuan, 19 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. z35 (2005).
' Harold Demsetz, Toward A Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC.
347 (1967).
4 Saul Levmore, Two Stories about the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S4 21
(2002); Saul Levmore, Property's Uneasy Path and Expanding Future, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
181 (2003).
extension of regulation is inefficient.5 He does not discuss whether and how
his thesis could be applied to the evolution of property rights.
Interest groups could have been highlighted in Heller's analysis of
commercial real estate reform in Russia because most of the holders of various
sticks of property rights to the Moscow stores were actually government
agencies and other government-affiliated institutes.6 But Heller downplayed
this side of the story and focused on the fragmentation of property rights in
general, which might be attributed to his agenda to develop a general theory
on property rights rather than investigate the political process of the Russian
property reform. Post-communist property reform provides an excellent
chance for us to observe how interest groups and the political structure in
general influence the evolution of property rights. However, legal scholars
have rarely pursued this path. This paper aspires to bridge this gap.
In other disciplines, mainly political science and transitional
economics, there has been a major debate on the choice of path in post-
communist transition: shock therapy or partial reform.7 Some scholars argue
that shock therapy is better than partial reform to overcome the old
communist interests. Others argue that partial reform could foster social
groups that benefit from reform and would support further reform. In
particular, Qian and others call China's partial reform "a reform without
losers."8 I posit that the current state of China refutes their argument and
proves that the debate has been missing the point. The biggest barrier to
reform, at least in the Chinese context, is not the interest groups rooted in the
old communist regime, but the interest groups fostered by the partial reform.
' Saul Levmore, Interest Groups and the Problem with Incrementalism, 158 U. PA. L. REV
815 (2010).
6 Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy oftheAnticommons: Property in the Transition from
Marx to Markets, 11 HARV. L. REV 621 (1998).
7Joel Hellman, Winners Take All, 50 WORLD POL. 203 (1998).
8 Lawrence J. Lau, Yingyi Qian, & Gerard Roland, Reform without Losers:An
Interpretation of China's Dual track Approach to Transition, io8 J. POL. ECON. 120 (zooo).
They benefited from the partial reform and would prefer to extend the period
of the partial reform. This is the problem China is facing today, and this
problem is particularly acute in land use reform in China.
This paper argues that the so-called rural land problem is the
consequence of China's partial land use reform. In 1988, the Chinese
government chose to conduct land use reform sequentially: first urban and
then rural. It was a pragmatic move because it would focus the reform and
provoke much less resistance. It also made local governments in China the
biggest beneficiary and supporter of the partial reform. 9 However, a
beneficiary of partial reform does not necessarily support further reform
because of the excessive rents available between the market of urban real
estate and the government-controlled system of rural land development and
transfer. The central government, in particular its agency in charge of land
administration (the former Bureau of Land Administration, which has been
elevated to the Ministry of Land and Resources (the "MLR")), also has interests
embedded in the current regime with the explicit goal of preserving
agricultural land. In contrast, Chinese farmers and other interested groups
have no voice or power in the political process of the reform, which makes it
difficult for the central government o achieve an agenda that balances the
interests of all parties.'0
' Land sales revenue became an important source of Chinese local governments. In
some Chinese cities, half of the local government finance is from land sales revenue.
Thus, it is not that particular individuals or constituencies benefited from land sales, or
at least not directly. Of course, there are beneficiaries of the government-dominated
rural-urban land conversion, including real estate developers, and the department of
land administration, which is able to maintain its budget and importance within the
government system due to the existence of such a system. In general, land sales
revenue has been in the public pocket of local governments, rather than in particular
individuals or constituencies. The revenue has been used in maintaining the operation
of the government and in various city public infrastructure projects.
10 The influence of the partial reform on farmers is complicated. On one hand, it does
give local governments incentives to grab farmers' land, which would not be so strong
if there was no such a reform. On the other hand, thanks to the reform, local
governments can afford to pay higher compensation to farmers than they could
otherwise. In a more general way, urban land use reform was crucial to China's market
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However, this is not to say that a country, even without a democratic
political structure, would necessarily be trapped in the partial reform
equilibrium. In the China case, Chinese farmers challenged the existing system
by forming a huge small-property market, through which social groups
disadvantaged by the partial reform, mainly Chinese farmers and members of
the middle-and-low income urban population, present their interests and
display their capacity to counteract the goals of the central and local
governments. This has led to adaptive policy changes. Recent news shows that
Chinese land reform is moving in a direction that would address Chinese
farmers' concerns, though much work is needed to unify the small-property
market and the legal real estate sector.
My historical investigation builds not only on my systematic
examination of national laws and landmark resolutions of the Chinese
Communist Party ("CCP"), but also on government documents generated in
their drafting processes, ordinances, regulations, notices, communications
between the central government and local governments, and memoirs of
retired national leaders and senior government officials who participated in
the reform. This paper is organized as follows. Part I introduces the dual land
ownership system in China. Part II and Part III investigate the urban land use
reform and rural land use reform, respectively. Part IV explores how Chinese
farmers have promoted policy changes through their illegal land uses. Part V
concludes.
I. Dual Land Ownership and Rural-Urban Land Conversion
Article ten of the current Chinese constitution reads that urban land is
owned by the state and rural land is owned by collectives (except those owned
by the state according to law). This is what dual land ownership means. The
transition and has greatly facilitated China's urbanization process, from which farmers
have benefited a lot. One example would be job opportunities for farmers who work in
cities as migrant workers.
most important character of this dual land ownership is the dominating role of
the state landowner over the collective landowner, with the former's monopoly
over rural-urban land conversion. Through this dissertation, "urban land" and
"rural land" are legal terms regardless of the physical characteristics of the land.
Rural land can be near the city center, such as that in some intra-city villages,
and urban land can be far away from the city center, such as those remote
villages that were requisitioned by the government in recent years. In the
following section, I discuss the origin and structure of dual land ownership in
China.
A. State Ownership of Urban Land
The undisputed moment at which private land ownership in China
was abolished was the passage of the 1982 Constitution, which, for the first
time in the history of the People's Republic of China, declared that urban land
is state-owned without exceptions. Although several letters solicited from the
populace on the draft of the 1982 Constitution addressed the state-ownership
of urban land, this clause faced little dispute within the amendment
committee." The 1982 Constitution recognized the de facto demise of private
land ownership caused by the Cultural Revolution for two reasons. First, in the
ideological struggle between market and planned economies, the latter still
prevailed. The orthodox Marxist understanding of property was strictly
followed and, thus, there was no need to deny the nationalization of urban
real estate in the Cultural Revolution. It was not until two years later in 1984
that the CCP finally achieved consensus on building a commercial economy
with planning (you jihua de shangping jingji). Second, it was widely regarded
that state ownership of urban land would serve the purposes of state-
dominated economic development, as demonstrated by the proposal to
nationalize rural land described in Part lB.
" Cheng Xueyang (WR PH), <pinyin here> ( l F ) [The Origin of
State Ownership of Urban Land], <pinyin here> (A!M#) [YAN HUANG CHUN QIU MAG],
No. 6, 2013,
B. Collective Ownership of Rural Land
CCP's promise to reallocate landlords' land to millions of peasants
contributed to the civil war victory over the Nationalist Party in 1949. The
Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
(which was passed in September 1949 and served as the temporary
constitution of the People's Republic of China until 1954) made a system of
"peasant land ownership" a goal of the new Communist government and
protected the private property of "workers, peasants, the petty bourgeoisie and
the national bourgeoisie. W2
However, this did not last long. The CCP began to promote the
establishment of farmers' coops (hezuohua) in rural areas in 1951, which led to
the establishment of the people's commune system in 1958.' 3 The people's
commune consisted of three echelons: the commune, the production brigade
and the production team.'
Since the early 198os, the Household Responsibility System
(hereinafter "HRS") has replaced the people's commune system as the main
rural land institution. Under the HRS, the collective should contract
collectively owned land to individual households. Individual households as
contractors of rural land are free to use the contracted land for agriculture. In
the past three decades, the contract rights have gradually matured to quasi
property rights due to the extension of the contract period from 15 years to
"permanency" (changjiu bu bian)' and the establishment of measures to
12((PIA [ [ , 4)) [THE COMMON PROGRAM OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S
POL. CONSULT. CONF., Article 31.
13 MV C: (q[ Jg 60) , Af -iW4 2009 *&[Chen Xiwen et al.,
Six Dccades of the Evolution of Chincsc Rural Institutions, PEOPLE'S PUBL'G I lOUSE io-i6
(2009).]
14 See Peter Ho, Who Owns China's Land? Policies, Property Rights and Deliberate
InstitutionalAmbiguity, 166 CHINA QUART. 394, 404-405 (2O01).
"See e e+ -b5 j (2oo8 10 12 HrP
- [Gazette of Third Plenary Session of
the 17'h CCCCP, promulgated Oct. 12, 2oo8.]
protect rural households' contract rights from the interference of rural
collectives.'6 Rural land is categorized into three types: residential land;
agricultural land, and public construction land. The permitted uses of different
categories of rural land are strictly controlled, and farmers are prohibited from
diverting land to any other urban use - which encompasses any use not listed
among the three categories above.
C. Structure of Chinese Local Government and Rural-Urban Land
Conversion
In 1982, the Standing Committee of the NPC passed the Regulations
on the Requisition of Land by the State for Construction ("RRLSC"). Article
Two of the Regulations said that:
When the state conducts economic, cultural and national defense
construction and social public affairs, it should requisition collective-owned
land according to this regulation. All direct or covert buying or renting of land
from rural people's communes and production brigades by any unit shall be
forbidden. Rural people's communes and production brigades shall not
16 The last nationwide reallocation of rural land happened in 1998. In 2002, the central
government passed the Rural Land Contract Law ("RLCL"), which stipulates that
farmland tenure security must be maintained for at least 30 years. The third plenary
session of the seventeenth Party congress also decided that the current land contract
system "should not be changed for a long time." (changjiububian) Thus under the
current law and policy, village collectives have no right to change or revoke the
contract. Under very exceptional situations, such as natural disaster, adjustment of the
land contracts should be agreed by two-thirds majority of villager representatives
approved by the local government. See, e.g., Article 27 of RLCL. Farmers can seek
conciliation by local governments, special arbitration, and litigation for rural land
contract disputes. See Article 51 of RLCL. However, failure to allocate land to the newly
increased population often induced conflicts among village members if the above law
and policy were strictly implemented. Administrative land reallocations then still
continued in some villages to accommodate demographic changes in these places. Land
requisition is another reason for land reallocation. According to a 2005 seventeen-
province survey, 30.3% of the villages carried out land reallocation after 1998. See
Ellickson, infra note 24; Zhu Keliang et al., The Rural Land Question in China:Analysis
and Recommendations Based on a Seventeen-Province Survey, 38 N.Y.U. J. INTVL L. & POL.
761, 794 (20o6); see also Hui Wang, et al, To Reallocate or Not: Reconsidering The
Dilemma in China's Agricultural Land Tenure Policy, 28 LAND USE POL'Y 805 (2011).
participate in the business operations of any enterprise or institution by
contributing land as shares.
It was clear from the RRLSC that all land use must be consistent with
the State's economic plan. Rural land was supposed to be used for agriculture
and the livelihood of farmers, and it could only be used for "construction" if it
was approved under the economic plan. State requisition is the only legal way
of converting collectively owned land, which could only be used for
agricultural and related uses, to state-owned land, which could be used for
various construction projects.
Which level of the government represented the state in these types of
conversions? According to Article Seven of the RRLSC, the city and county-
level governments were responsible for selecting sites and requisitioning land
for specific projects. Land requisition was subject to the approval of the
provincial or central government, and decisions were made according to the
size of the land requisitioned. City and county-level governments were able to
approve requisition of land of no more than three mu of arable or garden land,
ten mu of forestry or grassroots land, and twenty mu of other kinds of land.
Although often subject to the approval of upper level governments, city and
county-level governments were the actual managers of the state ownership of
land.
Why were county and city governments responsible for land
management? In contrast with the U.S., China is a unitary state, meaning that
all powers of local governments are delegated by the central government.
Generally speaking, Chinese local governments are divided into four levels:
province, city, county, and township, as shown in the following graphic:
Figure 1.1. The Structure of the Chinese Government
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Chinese provinces tend to be too large as an economic development
unit and townships tend to be too small. Cities and counties, on the other
hand, tend to be of an efficient scale for economic management. In China's
economic reform process, cities and counties have become the administrative
units that actually manage the economy.'7 Naturally, city/county governments
are the real managers of land within their jurisdictions. In the U.S., land use
power is also within the hands of the city or county governments.
Taking a Chinese city/county as an example, the structure of land
ownership is as shown in the following graphic:
17 K : ((+At [ h$[Jt)) , H NliA± 2009 4J [Steven N.S. Cheung, The
Economic System of China, CITIC PREss GROUP (2009)] (concerning inter-county
competition in China).
Figure 1.2. Dual Land Ownership in China
However, the boundary between urban land and rural land is not
static. City/county governments can change this boundary by requisitioning
rural land and converting it to urban land. The two kinds of land ownership,
state ownership of urban land and collective ownership of rural land, are not
equal. Managers of rural land (the people's communes) were under the
leadership and control of the county governments. The organizational
hierarchy of the Chinese government and the county and city governments'
legal power to requisition rural land for urban construction made it easy for
city and county governments to encroach upon the collective ownership of
rural land.
The former people's commune consisted of three echelons: the
commune, the production brigade and the production team.'8 The people's
communes were under the direct control of counties or city governments. The
reforms initiated in 1978 by Deng Xiaoping dismantled the communes and
granted individual households the right to use the land. Generally, the
township (xiang/zhen) replaced the commune, the village (cun) replaced the
production brigade, and the villagers' group (cunmin xiaozu) replaced the
production team, as shown in the following diagram.'9 However, the political
18 See Ho, supra note 15, at 404-5.
19 Id. at 405.
structure of the local government did not change fundamentally. Townships
were still under the direct control of the city/county governments. Village-
level self-governance organization, under the leadership of the party branch,
also remains a puppet of the local government.
20
Moreover, at the policy level, city and county governments represent
the interests of all units and individuals under their jurisdictions in the
national political arena, including the rural sector. Villagers do not have direct
access to the political process of policy making. Even in exceptional situations
where the villagers' leaders are selected to serve as members of the NPC, their
voices and influence are subject to and inferior to that of city and county
government leaders.
Thus, politically speaking, Chinese farmers still do not have their own
"autonomous organizations" that can represent their interests in national
policy making. Their rights to use the land contracted to them are easily
encroached upon by the city and county governments' power to requisition
land. The relationship between owners of urban land and rural land is the key
to understanding the land use reform discussed in the following parts.
Figure 1.3. Chinese Government Structure under the City-Level after 1978
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20 See Shitong Qiao, Governing the Post-Socialist Transitional Commons, 24 CoLo. J.
INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 115, 146-148 (2012).
II. URBAN LAND USE REFORM
Urban land use reform was initiated and captured by Chinese city
governments. A urban land use market provided Chinese city governments
with the financial resources urgently needed for urban construction and public
investment, and has been a main engine for urbanization and economic
development in China. Chinese local governments' pursuing of financial
interests forced the central government o concede most of the land revenue
to them and has deeply shaped the Chinese land regime.
A. The Creation of Land Use Rights: From Shenzhen Experiment to
Constitutional Amendment
Before 1979, land was controlled by the state and used by various
government units for free in accordance with Marxist principles stating that
the price mechanism was inapposite after abolishing private property.
However, with the implementation of the reform and opening-up policies,
state ownership of land must be given a richer understanding than under
Marxist orthodoxy.
The cities at the frontier of reform and opening up blazed a trail of
land use reform. On December 31, 1979, the Director of the Shenzhen City
Construction Commission signed a contract with a Hong Kong investor,
according to which the Shenzhen city government contributed land, the Hong
Kong investor financed the land development and the Hong Kong investor
shared in a fixed percentage of the profits."' On December 5, 198o, the
Shenzhen City Construction Commission signed the first "land use fee"
contract with a Hong Kong investor, which included the essential contents of
today's standard contracts of assignment of state-owned land use rights
between local governments and real estate developers, including the term (30
2 : ((A j fll+0 ---+)) , MA* Ex V.)) 2006 * 6 ,H 22 H [Jie Feng, Two
Decades of Shenzhen Land Administration, SHENZHEN SEZ DAILY, June 22, 2oo6],
http://www.szpl.gov.cn/xxgk/gzdt/zwdt/2oo9o8/t2oo9o8z54619o.html.
years in this contract) and price of the land use (HKD 5000 per square
meters) .22
Law-making and the practice of land use fees discussed above could
be considered a prologue because of their limited scale, which ultimately
served as the beginning of a norm cascade.3 Shenzhen, the first special
economic zone ("SEZ") of China, went a step further. In November 1981,
Shenzhen created its own regulation of land administration, which also
required domestic investors within Shenzhen, rather than just foreign
investors, to pay one-time land use fees.4
However, without a land market, the standard land use fee was
arbitrarily fixed by law and was applied to all construction projects.25 Users
who valued the land most did not have an opportunity to reveal their
willingness to pay higher prices. Shenzhen, as the first city to charge land use
fees, first felt the constraints of the land use fee. After studying the crown land
26sales in Hong Kong carefully, the Shenzhen government sensed the money-
generating power of a land market. It wanted to sell land, and it created a
slogan in response to the CCP's call to build a "commercial economy with
planning." The slogan was: "No land market, no complete commercial
economy." This reform faced an ideological challenge from Marxism: should a
socialist country that abolished private property sell land? In response to this
22 id.
2, See Robert C. Ellickson, The Market for Social Norms, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 1-49
(2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 903-968
(1996).
24 MA99FII *X±*MT3MtflN) (iA 18i*12 jq 2 4 F1
[Interim Regulations on Land Administration in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, art.
19] (promulgated by The People's Cong. of Guangdong Province, Dec. 24, 1981).
V 55 -', 1990 * 5 A 19 F ) [Interim Regulations on Land Administration in
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, art. 16] (promulgated by St. Council Order No. 15,
May 19, 199o).
26 See Roger Nissim, Land Administration and Practice in Hong Kong (2d ed. 2oo8).
challenge, reformers separated land use rights from land ownership. A local
reformer checked the classics by Marx and Engels page by page and cited
words from Engels as support. Engels wrote that, "[A]bolishing private
ownership of land does not require abolishing land rents; rather it requires
submitting land rents to the society."27 Thus selling land use rights would not
challenge state land ownership in China and would allow the state to utilize
land rents.
Shenzhen eventually held the first public auction of transferrable land
use rights in the history of PRC on December 1, 1987, in direct conflict with the
then effective Land Administration Law ("LAL") and Constitutional Law.28 The
public defiance led to the legal authorization of transfer of land use rights by
the People's Congress of Guangdong Province (the province where Shenzhen
was located) on January 3, 1988, and more importantly, the Chinese
Constitutional Amendment that allows the transfer of land use rights on April
12, 1988,29 and a similar amendment o the LAL on December 29, 1988.30
The 1988 amendments of the Constitution and LAL removed the legal
barrier against selling land use rights for local governments. On May 19, 199o,
the State Council promulgated detailed rules governing the sales of land use
rights from the government and the transfer among land users, i.e., the
Interim Regulations of the People's Republic of China Concerning the
Assignment and Transfer of the Right to the Use of the State-owned Land in
27 Feng, supra note 22.
28Id.
1i)V) [See Article Two of the 1988 Constitutional Amendment].
30A
(988 I 12 A 29 HM -=0MH&'= ;k@fii , 1988 * 12
)1 29 H 4ZiiT) '!i M+ IfZ H IT) [1988 LAL Revision]
(promulgated by Nat'l People's Cong., Dec. 29, 1988).
the Urban Areas, which is still in effect today.31 It confirms that the transfer of
land use rights is the responsibility of city and county governments.
B. The Central-Local Distribution of Land Sales Revenue
The 1988 amendments were silent as to the distribution of land sales
revenue. However, as land use reform was implemented by city governments,
city governments initially controlled land sales revenue and could use them
for their own purposes. This situation soon changed when the central
government, as the ultimate owner of state land, promulgated a notice on May
12, 1989, providing that 40% of the land sales revenue should be submitted to
the central government.'
Local governments, who not only tried to hide their land sales revenue
from the central government, but also threatened to stop land use reform if
they gained little from it, resisted this promulgation. Due to the large number
of cities engaging in land use reform, the central government had no way of
knowing how much land sales revenue each city had collected. As a result, one
year later on September 26, 199o , the Chinese Ministry of Finance
promulgated another notice that stipulated that the central government would
return its share of land sales revenue to local governments for urban
construction.33 The reasons for the central government's concession were clear:
"to promote the transfer of state-owned land use rights and to consider the
55 -, 1990 ' 5 Aq 19 l ) [the Interim Regulations of the People's Republic of
China Concerning the Assignment and Transfer of the Right to the Use of the State-
owned Land in the Urban Areas].
5 f l H ) [Notice on Strengthening Management of Revenue from Transfer of State-
Owned Land Use Rights] (promulgated by the State Council, May 12, 1989).
33~ ~ < = ± Ah } l] ] )((90)
Ail 4=, 199o 4 9 A z6 l ) [Ministry of Finance Notice on the Revenue of Transfer
of State-Owned Land Use Rights Submitted to the Central Government] (promulgated
by the Ministry of Finance, Sept. 26, 199o).
practical situation of local governments."4 A more fundamental change came
on December 15, 1993, when the State Council promulgated a decision that re-
divided the tax power of the central government and local governments in an
effort to benefit the central government's finances.35
Taxes since then have been divided into state taxes and local taxes.
The central government established its own tax collection agencies all over the
country. Land sales revenue, which had proved hard to collect without the
assistance of local governments, was completely conceded to local
governments.6
This was not the end of bargaining over the distribution of land sales
revenue between the central and local governments.37 On April 15, 1997, in a
notice from the CCCCP and the State Council on the preservation of
agricultural land, the central government decided that all revenue from the
increased construction land (i.e. urban construction land converted from rural
land) should be submitted to the central government and used in the
development of land for agricultural use."' It hoped that by decreasing the
incentive for local governments to requisition agricultural land, it could
34 Id.
3' Guanyu shixing fenshui zhicai zhengguanli tizhi de jueding -
J J) [Decision on Implementing Tax Division in Finance Administration]
(promulgated by the St. Council, Dec. 15, 1993, effective Jan. 1, 1994).
36 Id.
7 Throughout this research, "local government" is used as distinct from "central
government," and can refer to any level of the provincial, city, county, or township
government. The most relevant local governments in this research are the city- and
county-level governments. I use "local government" in a general way when there is no
need to specify or the behaviors of the city/county governments cannot be
distinguished from those of the lower levels of the government; otherwise I specify the
particular level of the government according to the specific situations.
'8 Guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang tudi guanli qieshi baohu gengdi de tongzhi (f - hO]
:L*_Iff INt 90) [Notice on Strengthening Land Administration and
Preserving Agricultural Land] (promulgated by the St. Council and the Central Comm.
of the CCP, Apr. 15, 1997, effective Apr. 15, 1997).
achieve its goal of agricultural land preservation.39 This move by the central
government led to another round of bargaining between central and local
governments in the 1998 LAL revision.
The 1998 LAL revision was the direct product of the above notice.
However, in the first draft of the LAL revision (songshen gao), which was
submitted by the SBLA to the Bureau of Legal Affairs of the State Council
("BLA") on August 18, 1997, the proposal was changed so that forty percent of
the revenue from rural-urban land conversion should be submitted to the
central government. The reason was that, after the SBLA submitted the first
draft to the BLA, the latter solicited comments from local governments, other
departments of the central government, legal experts, and other groups. Under
the prevalent opposition of local governments, the BLA made the above
change.4 ° The BLA then submitted the revised draft to the National People's
Congress, which publicized the draft for public comments. Again, according to
the official interpretation of the 1998 LAL, edited by Bian Yaowu, the then
deputy director of the Committee of Legal Affairs of the NPC ("CLANPC"),
"The ratio of the central-local distribution of the revenue from increased
construction land was quite controversial in the discussions." ' Local
governments suggested that the ration submitted to the central government
should be lowered for various reasons. Nevertheless, in the third meeting of
the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People's Congress on June 24,
1998, the CLANPC suggested keeping the ratio at 40% for the purposes of
39 Id.
40 Zhang Qingyong (K-Af) Zongxiang caizheng jingzheng taojiahuanjia yu
zhongyang-difang de tudi shouru fencheng - dui woguo 20 shiji 8o niandai yilai tudi
shouru de kaocha (ar1 -A , - 20
t12 8o *f, Wk-t-A M, -A,-V) [Vertical Fiscal Competition, Bargaining, and the
Land Revenue Sharing Relationship between Central and Local Governments in China],
http://www.unirule.org.cn/xiazai/2oo7n/69.pdf.
41 Zhonghua renmin gongheguo tudi guanlifa fashiyi IN fL M ,11)
[INTERPRETATION OF PRC LAND ADMINISTRATION LAW] (Bian Yaowu [--MA] et al. eds.,
Falii Chubanshe [8"IKV4±] [Legal Press] 1998).
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more efficient use of urban land and the preservation of agricultural land.'2
However, in the fourth meeting two months later, this ratio was finally
lowered to 3o% as a result of suggestions from some local governments and
members of the Standing Committee of the NPC.43 The 1998 LAL revision
proved that local governments had substantial control and bargaining power
over the distribution of land revenue. This is because the central government
is forced to rely on local governments, mainly city and county governments, to
manage state-owned land, which gives local governments great leverage in
formulating national land laws and policies. With regard to daily land
administration, the central government also faces frequent challenges from
local governments.
C. Regulating Local Governments' Land Use Power
Even before the 1988 constitutional amendment that allowed the
transfer of land use rights, illegal land use by local governments was a problem.
Local governments always had incentives to requisition more land than they
needed because land could be requisitioned at relatively low prices. This
problem became more significant after the legal authorization of a land use
market in 1988 that provided local governments more incentives to requisition
land due to the profits from land sales.
The central government's control over land use was confronted with
two serious challenges. First, though China allowed the transfer of state-
owned land use rights, it did not abolish the land assignment system, in which
different kinds of government agencies and institutes, including state-owned
enterprises, could obtain land for free. Once there was a market for land use
rights, all these players could profit by transferring their rights to use the
state-owned land. They continued to apply for state-owned land under the
guise of their own uses, but such application was actually for future profit-
making transfers. Second, as collective-owned land could be requisitioned and
42 Zhang, supra note 6o.
4 Id.
converted to state-owned land, various government agencies requisitioned
rural land without clear authorization. City and county governments did not
bother to seek approval from upper level governments in many situations.
When the value of land use rights was recognized and there was no
clear definition and enforcement of state land ownership, a rush to grab and
develop state-owned land occurred. State-owned land includes land that was
originally collectively owned by farmers and then requisitioned by the
government. This resulted in the aforementioned real estate bubble as well as
a rapid decrease in the amount of agricultural land.
In numerous notices and regulations, the SBLA emphasized that it
must "strengthen the high monopoly of transfer of land use rights," ("ia qiang
dui tu di chu rang de gao du long duan") and "approval of land requisition with
only one pen" ("yi zhi bi shen pi")." The SBLA devoted many resources to
building a system that centralized the control of the use of state-owned land
within the government system and did not tolerate land use outside of the
system it was endeavoring to build. This has greatly impacted the rural land
use reform discussed here.
IlI. RURAL LAND USE REFORM
Chinese farmers' spontaneous transfer of rural land has occurred at
the early stage of China's market transition, but a rural land use market would
jeopardize the local governments' monopoly over land supply. Comparing with
the local governments' strong bargaining power in the making of central-
4Guanyu jinyibu jiakuai tudi shiyong zhidu gaige de tongzhi ( ==-?~ ±II
) J$J)= fl) [Notice on Further Promoting Land Use Reform] (promulgated by
State Bureau of Land Administration, June 25, 1992, effective June 25, 1992); Guanyu
yange yifa shenpi tudi de jingji tongzhi (
[Emergency Notice on Strictly Approving Land Use] (promulgated by State Bureau of
Land Administration, July 31, 1992, effective July 31, 1992); Guanyu dui fangchan kaifa
gongsi jian shangpinfang chushou xingwei de dingxing ji falui shiyong wenti de qingshi
de dafu (O tRmiI -0 IhJflf - )
[Reply on Legal Issues Regarding Commercial Real Estate Development] (promulgated
by State Bureau of Land Administration, Oct. 16, 1992, effective Oct. 16, 1992).
government laws and policies, farmers could only be represented rather than
represent their own interests, and were basically voiceless. As a result,
spontaneous market transactions did not lead to legalization of rural land use
transfer, but "the strictest land use control system in the world," emphasizing
the government monopoly over rural-urban land conversion.
A. Rural Land Transfer Is Nothing New
The first decade of China's economic reform began with the
establishment of the HRS, which liberated households from the people's
communes and greatly increased agricultural productivity. The need for better
housing came immediately after satisfying the need for food. In the early 198os,
farmers all over the country began to devote their savings to building houses.
The saying was that "each family was in preparation; each village was under
construction." (jiajia beiliao, cuncun dongtu).45 In 198o, the total floor area
built was 500 million square meters and in 1981 it was more than 6oo million
square meters.46 Within only two years, Chinese farmers built one square
meter for each person in China.
China had no specialized land administration agency before 1986.
Building rural houses was outside of the state economic plan and, thus, it flew
under the radar of local governments. Generally, local governments saw no
need to regulate rural housing construction-as quoted in the second rural
affairs conference of the central committee of the CCP, some local government
leaders said "farmers used their own money to build houses, so what was
wrong with that?"47 Local government officials also joined this trend and
became a main force in rural housing development. Under the central housing
4s Pizhuan dierci quanguo yicun fangwu jianshe gongzuo huiyi jiyao de tongzhi (itfj
-25e-AO [Summary of Minutes of the Second Rural




planning system, even a city mayor could not afford a spacious apartment. 4 It
would take several years to reform the urban housing sector and provide
enough apartments for employees of the government and other state sectors.
This unmet demand for housing could only be remedied by rural housing
development. The central government publicly acknowledged that the leading
role of local government officials was one main reason for this "rural housing
fever" (nongcun jianfang re).49 On Feb. 18, 1982, the OSC circulated an
investigation report among departments of the State Council. According to
this report, six central government agencies rented 31o rooms from rural hotels,
16 agencies bought or rented about 6o,ooo square meters of other rural
housing. These houses had been used for offices, training space, dormitories,
and many other uses.0 Such transactions, although prohibited, constituted a
real estate market. It was not unusual to see competition between the actions
of market participants and the profit-driven behaviors of rural collectives in
housing development."
This market was not a result of intentional reform. The 1982 RRLSC
stipulated that rural land must be requisitioned to be used in urban
'8Zhuanfa chengxiang jianshe huanjing baohubu guanyu fujiansheng jianjiang diqu
henshaluanzhan gengdi jianfangfeng de jianbao de tongzhi ( fi9Jl ",I
I ci_ L ,91Y ) [Forwarded Notice of the
Ministry of Urban and Rural Construction and Environmental Protection on the Rural
Housing Fever in Jinjiang of Fujian Province] (promulgated by the Office of the St.
Council, Sept. 17, 1982, effective Sept.17, 1982).
'9 Pizhuan dierci quanguoyicun fangwu jianshe gongzuo huiyi jiyao de tongzhi (IlL"M
-9Ea-AU) [Summary of Minutes of the Second Rural
Affairs Conference] (promulgated by the State Council, Jan. 7, 1982, effective Jan. 7,
1982).
'0 Zhuanfa guowuyuan jiguan shiwu guanliju <Guanyu yixie guojiajiguan, shiqiye
danwei zuyong zhaodaisuo he gouzushedui fangdichan wenti de diaocha baogao
tongzhi>(t.l-l[J j<:--llj ], I I-{3[ sT]
iI3Xj 1 R) -J ])[Forwarded Notice of the Bureau of Agencies on
Renting and Buying of Rural Real Estate by Some Central Government Agencies]
(promulgated by Off. of the State Council, Feb. 18, 1982, effective Feb. 18, 1982).
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construction and prohibited any form of buying or renting rural land." On
March 21, 1986, the State Council promulgated a notice, creating the SBLA,
whose main purpose was to regulate land use and prevent the waste of
agricultural land.3 In the same year, the NPC passed the first comprehensive
land administration law in China, which took effect in 1987. The 1987 LAL, on
one hand, restated the prohibition on the alienation of land. On the other
hand, it permitted rural collective organizations to use rural land to cooperate
with urban enterprises.4 This measure seemed to imitate urban land use
reform, which began by allowing state-owned land as a form of investment in
Sino-foreign joint enterprises.5 The 1987 LAL also permitted urban residents
to build houses in rural areas, subject to the approval of the county
government and the payment of fees according to the standard of
governmental land requisition)
6
In the initial period of China's economic reform, Chinese farmers and
their collectives developed and transferred rural land to realize its potential
52RRHCA art. z.
" Zhonggong zhongyang, guowuyuan guanyu jiaqiang tudi guanli zhizhi luanzhan
gengdidetongzhi. (+A+A. f]U[±± , $IPLMMJ d ) [CCP
Central Comm. and State Council Notice on Strengthening Land Administration and
Stopping Developing Arable Land] (promulgated by CCP Central Comm. and State
Council, Mar. 21, 1986) ST. COUNCIL GAZ. Apr. 20, 1986, at 243-246,
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/shuju/1986/gwybi986o9.pdf (China).
4 Zhonghua renmin gongheguo tudi guanlifa. (q1P X T ± R±± ) [Land
Administration Law] (promulgated by Standing Comm. People's Cong., June 25, 1986,
effective Jan. 1, 1987) (Chinalawinfo 1M:, 7 -- .$ . r,'IL')
http://www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext-form.aspx?Db=chl&Gid=2876, Dec. 29, 1988, at art. 36.
5 See Part II.A.
56 Zhonghua renmin gongheguo tudi guanlifa. ( U ±t-[]1 i ) [Land
Administration Law] (promulgated by Standing Comm. People's Cong., June 25, 1986,
effective Jan. 1, 1987) (Chinalawinfo ILI,,I @'j{, ,.,'i,)
http://www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext-form.aspx?Db=chl&Gid=2876, Dec. 29, 1988, at art. 41.
use and commercial value, which was not much different from Chinese city
governments' experiments with t e commodification of urban land. Land
commodification in both urban and rural areas challenged the old legal and
ideological systems, but there was reason to believe that China would achieve
land commodification, both in the urban and rural areas. Both the central
government (as revealed in the exceptions made in the 1987 LAL) and the local
governments (as revealed through their involvement with rural land
development and transfer) showed willingness to tolerate farmers'
development and transfer of rural land, particularly when this was done to
address legitimate social and economic needs.
B. Rural Land Transfer Is Not Legalized
In 1988, the NPC passed amendments to the Constitution and the LAL.
Both laws removed the prohibition on land rents and added a clause
permitting the transfer of land use rights, essentially a form of land renting.
The amendment to the 1988 Constitution said land use rights could be
transferred according to law. The 1988 amendment o the LAL stated it more
clearly-rights to use both state land and collective land could be transferred
according to law and the State Council would make specific regulations on the
transfer of land use rights. However, the added Section V, Article II of the LAL
said only that the state implemented "compensated use of state-owned land"
(guoyou tudi youchang shiyong) and did not mention the "compensated use of
collective-owned land." (jiti tudi youchang shiyong) In the report to the
Standing Committee of NPC, the Deputy Commissioner of the Committee of
Legal Affairs of the NPC, Lin Jianqing, revealed the reason:
"Regarding the use of collective land with consideration, some central
government departments and local governments raised that the main task of
deepening rural reform was perfecting the household responsibility system
(HRS). Implementing use of collective land with consideration might alter the
HRS and also raises all kinds of concrete questions; different regions are at
different levels of development and have different land management systems,
which makes it hard to settle down the details of use of collective land with
consideration. We could firstly experiment with collective land use reform in
some places and leave the laws untouched. In this way, we can further explore
and accumulate experiences to deepen rural reform."57
This reasoning against rural land use reform is understandable. HRS
was the focus of rural reform, and perhaps overall economic reform, through
the 198os. It is widely believed that China's economic reform began with
villagers' experimentation with the HRS in Xiaogang, Anhui in 1978.58 It was
first incorporated into the first No. i Document (yi hao wen jian) of the CCCCP
in 1982.' 9 The HRS gives individual rural households relatively secure rights to
farm the land they contracted from the rural collectives, and this practice has
rid China, a country that experienced 30 million deaths in the famine of the
Great Leap Forward, of the threat of hunger. 6o The great increase of
agricultural productivity also boosted the rise of township-village enterprises
and built the foundation of reform in the urban area. In the words of the CCP:
"First, to eat; second, to construct" (yi yao chi fan, er yao jian she). Therefore,
the Chinese government placed a very high priority on the security of the HRS.
"Lin Jianqing ( 1i), Quanguo renda falii weiyuanhui dui "Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo tudi guanlifa xiuzheng'an (cao'an)" shenyi jieguo de baogao. (i MA)Qi8
<( [The Committee
of Legal Affairs of the NPC Review Report of the Draft of the Land Administration Law]
(promulgated by Standing Comm. People's Cong., Dec. 23, 1988) (National People's
Congress of the Republic of China 4. N A K ,i& )
http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2000-12/26/content-5002215.htm.
'8 Qu Futian, Nico Heerink, and Wanmao Wang, Land Administration Reform in China:
Its Impact on Land Allocation and Economic Development, 12 LAND USE POL'Y 193-203
(1995).
59 Yibai bashi'ernian yihao wenjian: Quanguo nongcun gongzuo huiyi jiyao. (1982 * 1
- 3tjt: . tA-'i& -- ). [No. i Document of1982: Summary of the National
Annual Conference of Rural Affairs, promulgated Jan. 1, 1982)]. (China.com.cn + W IA
RO fm +, W ',,) http://www.china.com.cn/aboutchina/data/zgncggkf3on/2oo8-
04/09/content_1468446o.htm, Apr. 9, 2008.
6o Kung, James Kai-sing, & Justin Yifu Li, The Causes of China's Great Leap Famine,
1959-196, 52 ECON. DEV. CULT. CHANGE 51-73 (2003).
Even in the late 199os, the central government promulgated several
regulations to protect the security of the HRS.61 Going back to 1988, during
which time the HRS had only been formally recognized for less than six years,
villagers' rights to the contracted land were still often violated by village
collectives despite the central government's strict prohibition against such
breach. Villagers were further concerned about the credibility of the central
government's commitment to protecting their rights. To the Chinese
government, land use reform meant land rentals by the owner. In the urban
areas, the owner was the state and in the rural areas, the owner was the village
collective. Implementing land use reform in rural areas would mean granting
village collectives the right to transfer use rights for the rural land, most of
which had been granted to individual households through the HRS. Thus rural
land use reform would necessarily cause a rearrangement of rural land rights
in the direction of strengthening the control of the village collectives, which
would jeopardize the security of the villagers' rights to farm the contracted
land. This was a risk the central government would not take.
C. The Incompatibility of Rural Land Use Reform with Urban Land Use
Reform
Although the 1988 amendments of the constitution and the LAL
legalized the transfer of urban land use rights, the Chinese government still
needed to build a functioning land administration system. When the old
system of land use in the planned economy was collapsing without a clear
definition of property rights or a delineation of land administration power,
6,Guowuyuan pizhuan nongyebu guanyu wending he wanshan tudi chengbao guanxi
yijian de tongzhi. ( T± i[Th -).
[Notice of the Ministry of Agriculture on Maintaining and Improving Land Contracting
Relationships] (promulgated by the State Council, March 28, 1995).
Zhonggongzhongwang bangongting, guowuyuan bangongting guanyu jinyibu wending
he wanshan nongcun tudi chengbao guanxi de tongzhi. (+ , f ,'Y3 r
- iiffi~f) [Notice on Further Maintaining
and Improving Rural Land Contracting Relationships] (promulgated by the Off. of the
Central Comm. of the CCP and Off. of the State Council, Aug. 27, 1997).
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rural land became a limited-access commons for interested parties to grab.
6
,
The chaos impacting the whole land use system was demonstrated during the
1992-93 real estate bubble.63 Different types of public agencies and institutions
were rushing into the real estate business. The main source of the land was
rural land. Any public agency or institution could fake a need for construction,
which would serve as the basis to requisition rural land, and then devote the
acquired land to the real estate sector. Of course, farmers and their collectives
did not hesitate to develop their land when there were profit-making
opportunities.
Against this background, the SBLA and local governments tried to
centralize the land administration power within their hands and eliminate any
use of land outside of their control. This effort was due to both their desire to
have a functioning land administration system and their financial incentives.
Local governments acutely sensed the need to monopolize land use
supply. For example, early in 1989, the Fujian provincial government
emphasized in a notice that city and county governments must monopolize
the primary market of land use rights. In other words, rural collective-owned
land must be requisitioned and converted to state-owned land in order to be
transferred.6 4 In 1992, the Jilin Provincial government emphasized that the
land administrative agency was representative of state land ownership for the
same-level government and was in charge of the requisition and transfer of
62 See Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales,
Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 155 (1998) (A limited access
commons is common on the inside, but private on the outside).
63 See Part II.C.
64 Fujiansheng renminzhengfu guanyu churang he zhuanrang guoyou tudi shiyong
quanshidian zongzuo de tongzhi. ( 'A Jdf ±
AV -f-i*). [Notice on Experiments on the Assignment and Transfer of State-
Owned Land Use Rights], (promulgated by Fujian Province People's Gov., Sept. 5, 1989)
at 37.
rural land. All other agencies and institutions, including rural collective
economic organizations, should not transfer land use rights directly.
6,
To cool the 1992-93 real estate bubble, the SBLA promulgated an
emergency notice on July 31, 1992, emphasizing that the transfer of land use
rights must be highly monopolized. On November 4, 1992, the State Council
promulgated a notice, providing that collectively-owned land must be
officially converted to state-owned before being transferred.66 This stipulation
attempted to close the opened by the 1988 constitutional amendment that
permitted the transfer of use rights of collectively-owned rural land.6' From
this notice, we can see that there is a direct link between rural and urban land
use reforms. The choice was whether to allow farmers to sell rural land use
rights, or to require rural land to be requisitioned before being transferred.
There was no middle ground or time for delay, as once the transfer of urban
land use rights created a market for land use rights, buyers would be
interested in both urban and rural land. The more the urban land market
grew, the more demand and speculation there would be for rural land transfer.
As a result, in 1992, the State Council was forced to clarify that collectively-
owned rural land must be requisitioned before being transferred. Clearly, the
State Council was not ready to allow the transfer of rural land use rights.
On July 26, 1993, about one month after the burst of the real estate
bubble,68 the SBLA promulgated another notice emphasizing the monopoly of
land sales. According to the SBLA, without the strong monopoly on land sales
6, Jilinsheng renminzhengfu zhuanfasheng tudiguanliju guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang huabo
guoyou tudi shiyong quan guanli baogao de tongzhi. ('" R i MW±OWg
-n, iffiO) [Notice on Strengthening
Management of Assigned State-Owned Land Use Rights], (promulgated by Jilin
Province People's Gov., May 3, 1992), at no. 15.
66 Guowuyuan guanyu fazhan fangdichan ye ruogan wenti de tongzhi. (IN
SAO) [State Council on the Development of Real Estate Industry),
(promulgated by the State Council, Guofa No. 61, Nov. 4, 1992.)
67 Id.
68 China Property Net, supra note 69.
by the government, the use of land for construction would greatly exceed the
planned quota. 69 The 1993 notice clarified that the government must
requisition rural land before it could be transferred.7 It also emphasized that
the development of agricultural land must be strictly controlled."l In 1994, the
State Council promulgated the Regulation on Protection of Basic Agricultural
Land, which required local governments to mark some land as basic
agricultural land and made the approval procedure for developing this kind of
land more strict.72
The efforts to protect agricultural land,73 to build a uniform land
administration system, and to monopolize land supply led to the
comprehensive revision of the LAL in 1998.
D. 1998 LAL Revision: "The Strictest Land Use Control System in the
World"
69 Guojia tudi guanli ju guanyu jiaqiang hongguan tiaokong guan hao dichan shichang
de tongzhi. ( ±t *fW Ji i f ) [SBLA Notice on
Strengthening Macro Regulation of Real Estate Market] (promulgated by the State
Bureau of Land Admin., Off. of the SBLA, No. 120, July 26, 1993).
70 Id.
7 Id.
71 See <pinyin here> M*V, [* PAfVJ [Regulation on Protection of Basic Agricultural
Land], (promulgated by the State Council, August 18, 1994, effective Oct. 1, 1994),
http://w,.mlr.gov.cn/zwgk/flfg/tdglflfg/2004o6/t2oo4o625 _5 7o 37o.htm.
7 Central government leaders and policy-makers were genuinely concerned about
preservation of agricultural land, which is based on the consideration that food self-
cufficiency is a national security strategy that must be followed. Lester Brown's book,
"Who Will Feed China? Wake-Up Call for a Small Planet," caught widespread attention
and discussion in China after its publication in 1995. See Jiang Yaping (4[Elz) &
ZhangYali (I -li), <pinyin here> (
ft M- -11J-T-_r6) [Review of Three Major Reforms of Land Administration:
IntervieiJ with the First Director of the former State Land Administration Bureau],
<pinyin here> (Chinese here) [CHINA LAND & REs. DAILY], Dec. 5, 2oo8.; Yang Huiping
(f -), <pinyin here> (I{ [PA: mflthfirj[-.* "Im" ), [Changing China:
Land Law Reform after Tian Fengshan], <pinyin here> (0 H 4h) [TODAY'S EAsT] Dec. 1,
2003 (an interview with Professor Yan Jinmin who participated in the 1998 amendment
of the LAL.).] See also Gan, infra note 76.
In 1997, the CCCCP and the State Council decided to freeze non-
agricultural uses of agricultural land for one year to finish the revision of the
LAL.74 According to the deputy director of the revision team, the purpose was
to build "the strictest land use control system in the world" to preserve
agricultural land.75 Under the supreme goal of preserving agricultural land, the
1998 revision left little room for the transfer of rural land use rights. It revised
Article II of LAL from initially reading, "[U]se rights to the state-owned land
and collective-owned land can be transferred according to law" to reading,
"[L]and use rights can be transferred according to law." The intentional
deletion of "collective-owned land" signaled a change of tone. The pre-revised
Article II was pro-transfer of rural land use rights, subject to further legal
reform, while the revised version removed that option. Furthermore, Article 43
of the 1998 LAL states:
[A]ny unit or individual that needs to use land for construction must apply for
the use of state-owned land in accordance with law; however, use of
collectively owned rural land for township and village enterprises,
construction of village residences, or public facilities is allowed subject to
approval according to law.
This article makes the transfer of rural land use rights for non-rural
uses impossible according to law, despite the still effective 1988 constitutional
amendment on land use rights. Under this article, there are only three
situations in which collectively owned land can be used for construction:
township and village enterprises, construction of village residences, and public
facilities.
74 <pinyin here> : ±i -f-±±I Ji ]P)
[CCCCP and State Council on Strengthening Administration and Protection of
Agricultural Land] (promulgated by the Central Committee of the CCP and the State
Council) ZHONGFA No. 1n (1997), Apr. 15, 1997.
7' Gan Cangchun (Ulf-9), <pinyin here> (M .<±_ t himg>n filaafl, [The
Comprehensive Revision of Land Administration Law], <pinyin here> (rp [19WRAW
i") [6 CHINA L. DEV. COMMENTARY 38 (2011)] (Gan Cangchun led the 1998 revisions of
the Land Administration Law).
Article 63 of the 1998 LAL was even clearer, stating that, "The right to
use land collectively owned by farmers shall not be assigned, transferred or
rented out for non-agricultural construction."
The official interpretation of this article clearly states the purposes of
the prohibition on rural land transfer:
First, allowing collectively owned rural land into the market would influence
state-owned land use reform. As land market was just established in our
country, the government's regulation of the market is yet well- functioning;
the real estate fever and development zone fever in previous years have
created much vacant unused land; allowing collectively owned land into the
market would convert more of them into construction land, creating more
vacant land, which would make state-owned land use reform difficult to
proceed. Second, it is for the purpose of preserving agricultural land.
Township and village cadres are very enthusiastic about real estate
development; without strict control there would be tons of agricultural land
converted into construction land, making our purpose of preserving
agricultural land difficult to achieve.
76
This interpretation clarifies why top-down rural land use reform did
not lead to transferrable land use rights for farmers. The basic purposes of the
land administration system, including preserving agricultural land and land
supply monopoly, are in direct conflict with individual or decentralized
property rights. The parties who would benefit from individual or
decentralized property rights, such as villagers and their collectives, were the
silent majority in the process of the top-down rural land use reform. In the
making of national laws and policies, their opinions had little weight. During
the 1998 LAL revision, the Office of the Standing Committee of the NPC
solicited public comments on the revision draft for the first time since 1978,
76 Interpretation of Article 63 of the 1998 Land Administration Law; see Bian, supra
note 42.
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making it a precedent to open-door legislation in the post-1978 China.' In the
report to the Standing Committee, suggestions on the transfer of rural land
use rights were divided into two main types:
Some mass suggest that allowing the transfer of rural land use rights is
consistent with what's happening in reality and the market demand. Some
mass think that we should not allow the transfer of rural land use rights;
otherwise a lot of agricultural land would be converted to construction land
and farmers' interests would be grabbed by a few people. The Committee of
Legal Affairs holds that allowing rural land into the market is a very
complicated issue and needs serious research and suggests we maintain the
current prohibition.
78
Overall, Chinese farmers' interests in the transfer of rural land use
rights were not represented in the making of national laws and policies. They
remain characterized as "the masses" (qunzhong) who are never allowed to
take care of their own interests, but whose interests should be taken care of.
Compared to the local governments' overwhelming influence in making
national laws and policies (as seen during the bargaining over the distribution
of land revenue between the central government and local governments),
Chinese farmers' influence and voices were too weak to play a role.
In the market transition, partial reforms generated arbitrage
opportunities arising from rent-seeking between the liberalized sectors of the
economy and those still coordinated by nonmarket mechanisms. "
Beneficiaries of partial reform often attempt to block specific advances in the
7 Gan, supra note 124; <pinyin here> (x (1
tTV) U*iiAtQ ,0 if) [Notice on Soliciting Public Opinions on the Draft of the
Land Administration Law] (promulgated by the Off. of the Standing Comm. Nat'l
People's Cong., Apr. 29, 1998).
78 Li Boyong (inf), <pinyin here> (
9 (>VT#4) > tMAEW, t ) [The Report of the Committee of Legal Affairs
on the Review of the Draft of the Land Administration Law], taken from the Third
Meeting of the Standing Comm. of the Ninth NPC, June 24, 1998.
7' Hellman, supra note 8, at 219.
reform process that threaten to eliminate the remaining market distortions
upon which their special advantages are based. Instead of forming a
constituency in support of advancing reforms, these short-term winners have
often sought to stall the economy in a partial reform equilibrium that
generates concentrated rents.80
In the case of Chinese land reform, Chinese local governments
benefited from the partial land use reform, i.e., a liberalized urban land market
and an unreformed rural land regime. The overall purpose of land use reform
was to have a unified liberalized land market, as indicated in the 1988
constitutional amendment and other official documents. Starting reform from
the urban area made sense in the context of the historical background: local
governments needed money for urban construction and the focus of rural
reform was the household responsibility system. It was important to convince
the most powerful stakeholders of the land regime-local governments-to
support the reform. However, the winners of this partial reform, local
governments, sought to prolong the period of partial reform because taking
land from the unreformed rural sector and selling it on the liberalized urban
sector were too profitable to be given up easily.
The central government and the SBLA in particular, were concerned
about the preservation of agricultural land and a unified land administration
system. Local governments successfully prolonged the period of partial reform
by threatening the central government with the potential loss of agricultural
land and the chaos of land administration that might be caused by a
liberalized rural land market. These concerns, though not necessarily accurate,
were well grounded and easily accepted by a central regulator. Millions of
farmers did not have a say in the reform process and did not have a chance to
address these concerns of the central regulator. They are disadvantaged in this
partial reform, and their share of benefits is lower than in the case of complete
reform. This situation begs the question: is there a way for politically-weak
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80 Hellman, supra note 8, at 204.
farmers to drive this reform forward against the opposition of local
governments?
IV. "WEAPONS OF THE WEAK:" 8' INCREASING ILLEGALITY AND INSTITUTIONAL
ADAPTATION
The 1998 LAL revision consolidated the government's monopoly on
land, from which the government accumulated a huge amount of wealth.
Since then, land finance (tu di cai zheng) has become more and more
important to the Chinese government.82 Revenue from land sales has become
a major source of local government finance. From 2003 to 2012, the Chinese
government has requisitioned 37,400 square kilometers of rural land at an
average price of about 30,000 to 40,ooo RMB per mu, which was calculated
according to the agricultural value of the land. The total amount of revenue
from selling this land on the urban market was 15.2 trillion RMB, which has
supported China's rapid urbanization over the past years.
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However, at the same time, land conflicts became the top reason
behind large-scale mass incidents (da gui mo qun ti shi jian) in China, making
headlines in both Chinese and international media. This pressed the Chinese
central government to change its land regime. Most attention has been on the
reform of the eminent domain regime, including specifying the definition of
"public interest" for which rural land can be requisitioned and enhancing the
compensation standard in rural land requisition. In 2OlO, the State Council
promulgated the Regulations on the Requisition of Real Estate on State-
8, See JAMES ScoTT, WEAPONS OF THE WEAK: EVERYDAY FORMS OF PEASANT RESISTANCE (1985).
82Yuan Zhigang il), <pinyin here> (±IftklortJ ) [The Success and Failure
of Land Finance], YUAN ZHIGANG CAIXIN BLOG (Apr. 12, zoo),
http://yuanzhigang.blog.caixin.com/archives/3o15.
8sZheng Zhenyuan (UTMl), <pinyin here> (Wr 1 E4 + M ±JP-VJT &V) [New
Urbanization and China's Land Reform] [Taken from lecture minutes from Zheng
Zhenyuan, Apr. 23, 2013, 7:00 pm-9:oo pm, Moot Court Room of Peking Univ. L. School]
(on file with the author). Zheng Zhenyuan is a former senior official of the State Bureau
of Land Administration.
Owned Land, while a corresponding regulation on the requisition of rural real
estate was said to be under discussion. The effect of such efforts is still subject
to the test of time.
Mass protests, however, are only a rare form of resistance that Chinese
farmers take to contest for their property rights. An arguably more significant
everyday form of Chinese farmers' contestation for property rights - illegal
rural land development and sales - has received scant attention. This section
seeks to highlight the daily illegal property arrangements Chinese farmers
developed to deal with the formal land administration system and to explain
how this increasing illegality jeopardizes the normal functioning of the
Chinese land administration system and causes policy resistance at the
beginning, but policy adaptation at the end. The following articulates two
specific camouflages Chinese farmers have taken to develop and transfer rural
land.
A. Township and Village Enterprises ("TVEs")
Township and village enterprises (xiang zhen qi ye) emerged from the
market rather than from law. Originally it was the township and village
economic organizations that got involved in agriculture-related industries,
such as the processing of agricultural produces. Later, their activities extended
into other industry areas, such as family electronics, and beyond. Their
organization and ownership structure has never been clearly defined. It used
to be the township and village economic organizations that provided initial
capital and equipment and organized production. Later, that control fell into
the hands of individuals, mostly managers who were village cadres. TVEs were
viewed as a form of socialist enterprise and were thus recognized and
protected by law. Many Chinese entrepreneurs built their own enterprises
under the auspices of TVEs.
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84 See, e.g., Wenhong Chen, Does the Color of the Cat Matter? The Red Hat Strategy in
China's Private Enterprises, 3 MGMT. & ORG. REv. 55 (2007).
TVEs, due to their more flexible management structure, were more
attuned to market demand and had a great advantage against the SOEs in the
market for daily goods. TVEs were the main force of China's economic growth
from the mid-i98os to 199os. Even the 1998 LAL revision, which was intended
to implement the strictest control of land use in the world, made land use by
TVEs an exception to the prohibition on non-agricultural use of rural land.
TVEs' land is not allowed to transfer except in the cases of merging enterprises
and bankruptcy. The central government made this legal exception to promote
the development of TVEs, but it has become a main way for local practices to
access rural land development and transfer.
Under the TVEs, a large amount of rural land has been developed and
devoted to commercial and industrial uses, and even illegally transferred to
users outside of villages, resulting in huge markets for rural land.8, Through
illegal transactions, villagers were able to break the government monopoly of
the land market, and promote a bottom-up institutional change. For the few
Chinese local governments who experimented with granting farmers the right
to transfer rural land, the prevalence of illegal transactions was a common
motivation for their adaptive changes.
B. Agricultural Construction
As Article 63 of the 1998 LAL states that rural land use rights shall not
be assigned, transferred or rented out for non-agricultural construction, many
rural real estate businesses in China take the form of agricultural construction.
One typical form of small-property construction is called Greenhouse-Farm
Houses (in Chinese, "da peng fang," "GFH" hereinafter). In this type of
project, part of the greenhouse farms are built for storage and housing for farm
employees. It is possible to get this kind of projects approved by the
85 <pinyin here> (W ±Ffl± • M M H I : A M* ]o
fiA ')) , fN± .f)) [Ministry of Land Resources Bureau of Land Use,
Investigation Team of the MLR Bureau of Land Use, Innovate Institutions and Regulate
Transfers: Investigation Report on Transfer of Rural Construction Land, State-Owned
Land Letters] STATE LAND RES. DISPATCH No. 3, at 25 (2002).
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government as the Chinese government has promoted agricultural investment
in recent years. There has been a lot of investment activity in greenhouse
farms, which are legal and provide vegetables to large cities. In Beijing, the city
government has publicized over a dozen small-property neighborhoods under
the name of agricultural buildings, which are called GFH, Chicken Farm Dorm
(yangjichang zhuzhailou), Berry Garden (caomeiyuan), Planation Base
(zhongzhijidi), Fruit-Picking Orchard (caizhai yuan), and so on.
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Article 43 of the 1998 LAL provides that the construction of village
residences is allowed as an exception. This became another way to camouflage
small property, called uniformly constructed buildings ("tong jian lou," TJL
hereinafter). Recently the MLR has called for farmers to live in uniformly
constructed buildings, rather than individual residential houses, as a way to
preserve farmland. It is also consistent with the local governments' interests
because they do not want to use their quota of construction land to build
houses for farmers. Thus, village collectives often applied for construction
projects under the name of TJL. However, these projects provided more than
enough apartments for their villagers to live. A small portion of these units
was allocated or sold at very low prices to local villagers and the rest of the
units were sold to outsiders. TLJ has become the one of the main forms of
small property in Shenzhen.8 , In Beijing, reports have disclosed a similar form
of small property, which is called resettlement housing ("huiqian fang").a In
some government-approved projects, farmers whose land was requisitioned
are authorized to build a building to be used as resettlement housing. Farmers
86 <pinyin here> (JLiA - i io8 1 "dV')j A" ji 25 t) [Beijing Publicized io8 Small-
Property Neighborhoods and Already Demolished 25], <pinyin here> (Chinese) [PEOPLE'S
DAILY], re-printed on SOHO.cOM, Dec. 5, 2013,
http://roll.sohu.com/2o1312o5 /n 39131318o.shtml.
8
, See Shitong Qiao, Planting Houses in Shenzhen: A Real Estate Market without Legal
Titles, 29 CAN. J.L. & SOC. 253-272 (2014).
88 Zhao Yingying (A ), <pin yin here> Dull tM" fMWM#)
[Small-Property Sales in the Camouflage of Ecological Gardens], <pinyin here> (JML9,0
JR) 2012 * 9 A lo H, [BEIJING EVENING NEWSPAPER], Sept. io, 2012.
often make use of such opportunities to expand their projects and sell
apartments to make money.
C. Policy Resistance and Adaptation
This huge small-property market involves millions of farmers, middle-
and-low income buyers, various kinds of real estate developers, and
grassroots-level governments because small property promoted economic
development of particular districts where they are located and contributed to
business taxation89 of the grassroots-level governments. For city and central
governments, small-property houses also relieved them of the responsibility of
providing public housing and public facilities in the peripheral area of cities,
where most of the middle-and-low income population live. These combined
interests make small property a serious challenge to the current land system in
China.
The central government's initial response was to enforce the law. On
May 6 th
, 1999, the Office of the State Council promulgated a notice to
provincial governments and central government agencies, pointing out that
illegal transactions of collectively owned land had become a serious problem
and many such transactions were conducted in the name of orchards and
farms. This notice states very clearly that:
Farmers' residential houses cannot be sold to urban citizens; nor to
allow urban citizens to buy collectively owned land to build residential
houses....
Any units or individuals should not sign land use agreements with
rural collective economic organizations privately.... Agricultural and forestry
projects should use land strictly according to the approved use; change to real
estate development use is strictly prohibited; for legitimate needs of
accompanying facilities, approval for construction land use must be obtained
8 Companies, convenience stores and factories that use small-property houses as their
official locations need to pay business taxes. The grassroots-level governments do not
collect property tax from small-property owners.
according to law. 9This notice also requires provincial governments to
investigate illegal land transactions and halt approvals of orchards, farms, or
tourism agricultural projects until finishing the investigation.
The responses to this notice were poor. In the following years, the
central government emphasized the strict implementation and enforcement of
land administration laws again and again in many notices. On December 30,
2007, the OSC promulgated a notice on the strict implementation of rural
collective construction land laws and policies. It also used the term "small
property" for the first time in central government notices, marking the first
official recognition of the term coined by small-property market participants.
It provides that "urban citizens should not buy rural residential land, farmers'
residential houses, or 'small-property houses;' units and individuals should
not rent or occupy land collectively owned by farmers for real estate
development."9" The No. 1 Document of the CCP Central Committee of 2oo8,
promulgated on December 31, 2007, also referred to the term "small property
house" and reiterated the same prohibition as the OSC had the previous day.
9 2
Since 198o, the CCCCP has devoted its first annual official document to
agricultural policy, called No. 1 Document, laying down the agenda and
policies for a new year. The appearance of the term "small property" in such an
important document was an indication and confirmation that it had become a
national phenomenon that top policy makers could not ignore.
9 <pinyin here> ( -- ) [OSC on
Strengthening Land Administration and Prohibition of Land Speculation]
(promulgated by the Off. of the State Council, <date promulgated>, effective <effective
date>) GUOBAN FA No. 39, May 6, 1999.
9' Id.
9
2<pinyin here> ( PtAth, _
R1 [CCCCP and State Council Opinions on Strengthening Rural
Infrastructure Construction and Promoting Agriculture Development] (promulgated by
the Central Comm. of the CCP and State Council, <date promulgated>, effective
<effective date>) ZHONGFA No. i, December 31, 2007.
Meanwhile, policy reflection and change was under discussion. On
January 16, 2003, the CCCCP required local governments to encourage TVEs to
use land more efficiently through transfer of collectively owned construction
land and other ways.9 3 A similar stipulation appears in the State Council
Decision on Deepening Reform and Strictly Administering Land, which was
issued on October 21, 2004.9" On April 4, 2005, the State Council promulgated
the Opinions of the State Council on Deepening Reform of Economic
Institutions, which calls for further exploration of the market entry of rural
collective-owned land use rights.
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In early October 2008, at the Third Plenary Session of the 17th CCCPC,
the rural land use reform passed a new milestone. For the first time in the
history of land use reform in PRC, 20 years after the 1988 amendments of the
Constitution and LAL, the Chinese central government proposed to
"gradually unify the construction land use markets in urban areas and rural
areas" and that "legally-acquired rural collectively-owned construction land
has equal rights to state-owned land.' ' 6 It also emphasized that rural land use
rights must be transferred through a unified and visible market in a public way,
a clear indication of the central government's concern with the invisible and
hidden small-property market.
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Council Opinions on Agricultural and Rural Affairs] (promulgated by the Central
Comm. of the CCP and State Council, <date promulgated>, effective <effective date>)
ZHONGFA No. 3, Jan. 16, 2003.
94 <pinyin here>(Mi) [State Council on
Deepening Reform and Strictly Managing Land] (promulgated by State Council, <date
promulgated>, effective <effective date>) GUOFA NO. 28, Oct. 21, 2004.
95 <pinyin here> (M*Rl T 2005 'EL , ) [State Council
Opinions on Deepening Reform of Economic Institutions] (promulgated by the State
Council, <date promulgated>, effective <effective date>), GUOFA No. 9, Apr. 4, 2005.
96 <pinyin here> ( t¢ilJ ) [CCCCP
Decision on Several Crucial Questions about Promoting Rural Reform] (promulgated
by the Central Comm. of the CCP, <date promulgated>, effective <effective date>)
ZHONGFA No. 16, Oct. 15, 2oo8.
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This proposal was reiterated and reformulated as two points in the
decision of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CCCPC, promulgated on
November 12, 2013: (1) establishing a unified construction land market, thus
allowing rural collective construction land to be transferred in a similar
manner as state-owned land; (2) granting more property rights to farmers by
selecting several experimental sites and cautiously promoting the lien,
mortgage and transfer of farmers' property rights to their residential houses.
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Through the review of the policy change, we can see that the small-
property market has caused formal institutional change by demonstrating the
great interests embedded in a market of rural land use rights. Transferrable
rural land use rights not only serve Chinese farmers' interests, but they also
serve the interests of the central and local governments and of society overall.
It is not to say that the central and local governments' endowed interests in
the existing land system, including preservation of agricultural land and local
government finance, do not matter anymore. The lack of voice and political
power of Chinese farmers and their collectives was the main reason that land
use reform in China has remained partial and has only benefited the winners
of this reform, mainly local and central governments. This section suggests
that farmers and their collectives challenge this formal system through their
everyday resistance (i.e., illegal development and transfer of rural land),
sometimes under the camouflage of legal projects, and have influenced the
policy agenda of land use reform. Small property is the weapon of the Chinese
farmers. They are powerful because they greatly increased the costs of the whole
land administration system, and they eventually proved the legal prohibition on
rural land development and transfer impossible to implement. The central
government had no other choice but to reform the current system.
98<pinyin here> ('P - [Decision of the
CCCCP on Several Crucial Questions about Comprehensively Deepening Reform]
(promulgated by the Central Comm. of the CCP, passed during the Third Plenary
Session of the Eighteenth CCCCP, November 12, 2013, effective <effective date>).
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V. TOWARD A THEORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA?
This paper targets three groups: scholars of China study, post-
communist transition and property rights. First, to scholars of China study, it
brings to light certain legal and policy changes that had not previously been
fully examined and provides a comprehensive historical account and original
interpretation of the Chinese land reform in the past three decades. Second, to
scholars of post-communist reform, it endeavors to continue the shock
therapy vs. partial reform debate, which is not only theoretically but also
practically important to post-communist countries, including China and
Vietnam, both of which have taken the latter approach, and Russia and the
former east Europe bloc, which have taken the former approach. Moreover,
half-way through the post-communist transition, we are also in a better
position to evaluate the lasting reforms of both groups.
Lastly and the most importantly, to scholars of property rights, it is a
case study of the evolution of property rights. There are two stories about the
evolution of property rights. One is a bottom-up view and focuses on the costs
and benefits of property evolution; the other is a top-down view and focuses
on the political process of the evolution property rights. Contemporary
discussions on the evolution of property rights began with Demsetz's seminal
paper "Toward a Theory of Property Rights," which is still a starting point of
most discussions in this field after almost half a century of its publication. The
bottom-up or economic view of the evolution of property rights still
dominates the field through continuous theoretical and empirical studies.
Nevertheless, it is widely recognized that while this economic view might
explain the origin of property rights well, but " cannot explain the
development of complex property systems. '9
There has been increasing interests in the political process of property
rights in recent years. Fitzpatrick investigates the availability and effectiveness
of enforcement mechanisms to understand the property rights failure in
99 James Krier, Evolutionary Theory and the Origin of Property Rights, 95 CORNELL L. REV.
139-157 (2009).
contemporary Third World circumstances.'° ° Katz focuses on the interaction
between the state and individuals and argues that the formalization of private
property rights actually makes owners more vulnerable to the state and
enhances the state's governance powers over them.'0 ' Wyman emphasizes the
political character of property rights through studying the case of New York
taxicab medallions"2 and the evolution of individual tradable rights in U.S.
coastal fisheries.'0 3 As compared to the bottom-up approach, this top-down
approach of property rights is still under development and more empirical and
theoretical studies are needed.
To the author's knowledge, Levmore's interest group theory is to this
date the most concrete one on the political process of property rights
evolution, and worthy of further exploration in different backgrounds.
Anderson and Hill, Epstein, and Banner have also investigated the political
process of property rights in separate case studies.'4 Nonetheless, although
the above literature recognizes the key role of the government in the evolution
of property rights, it fails to investigate and incorporate the internal structure
of the government and its interactions with other parties into the evolution of
property rights, which are particularly crucial in understanding property
reform in developing and transitional countries. Building upon the above
studies, this Chinese land reform case, due to its complexity, provides a richer
account of the political process of evolution of property rights.
'o Daniel Fitzpatrick, Evolution and Chaos in Property Rights Systems: The Third World
Tragedy of Contested Access, 115 YALE L.J. 996 (2006).
'o' Larissa Katz, Governing Through Owners: How and Why Formal Private Property
Rights Enhance State Power, 16o U. PA. L. REV. 2029 (zolz).
'o2 Katrina Miriam Wyman, Problematic Private Property: The Case of New York Taxicab
Medallions, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 125 (2013).
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